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Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years 
(1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger 
predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family 
ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable 
when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also 
demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) 
contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, 
even under nonfamily contracting. 
The present study examines a variant of the 
agency contract, one that involves family ties be- 
tween principal and agent. We argue that in such 
family-related contracting, the exchange departs 
from purely economic motives and that family 
bonds between principal and agent have as a con- 
sequence forms of behavior different from eco- 
nomic rationality. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that family-related contracting decouples agent's 
employment from performance and business risk 
and that the termination of agents who enjoy family 
status has a salutary effect on firm survival. Empir- 
ical results comparing family and nonfamily con- 
tracting support these hypotheses. Furthermore, we 
found that executives operating under more 
strongly relational contracts tend to be held less 
accountable for observed results, even under non- 
family contracting. A relational contract is one that 
broadly states the terms and objectives of an agency 
relationship. Such contracts are ambiguous rather 
than explicit; the parties "do not agree on detailed 
plans of action but on goals and objectives" (Mil- 
grom & Roberts, 1992: 131). 
The study makes five important contributions to 
the firm governance literature. First, prior research 
has not examined the differences between family- 
related and non-family-related contracting. There- 
fore, the present study advances theoretical under- 
standing of relational contracts, where emotional 
rather than rational criteria govern the terms of the 
exchange. Second, the study suggests that family 
contracting is more likely to increase agency costs 
as a result of executive entrenchment. Furthermore, 
the study suggests that when firms engaged in fam- 
ily contracting put safeguards in place to curb these 
agency costs, firm survival improves. In prior the- 
oretical work on agency theory, scholars have gen- 
erally assumed that the threat of "moral hazard" 
and the costs of safeguarding against it are lowest in 
closely held firms because personal involvement 
by owner-managers supposedly eliminates the 
agency problem resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Third, the study examines how the nature of a 
position affects the strength of a relational contract 
and the implications this has for executive moni- 
toring. 
Fourth, in a broader sense this study makes a 
contribution to management theory and practice by 
addressing the family business research lacunae. 
Our own reading of this literature confirms the 
disconcerting conclusion that "the vast majority of 
business school research either ignores, or at best, 
glosses over the role of family in owning or man- 
aging business enterprises" (Litz, 1997: 55). This is 
indeed surprising, given that family-owned busi- 
nesses account for 40 to 60 percent of the U.S. gross 
national product and employ upward of 80 percent 
of the workforce (Neubauer & Lank, 1998); these 
figures are much higher in most other countries 
(Madura, Martin, & Jessell, 1996). 
Lastly, and related to the prior point, the sample 
used for this study is valuable for reasons beyond 
family-related considerations because its members 
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are from outside the United States. Management 
research, particularly on corporate governance, has 
been conducted mainly in North America and, to a 
lesser extent, in England. Our study covered the 
entire population of 276 Spanish newspapers dur- 
ing the period 1966-93. Most of these firms are 
relatively small and are family-owned, thus repre- 
senting the prototypical firm in most of the world, 
unlike the large, Fortune 1000 U.S. firms normally 
used in agency research. 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Family Contracting, Nonfamily Contracting, and 
Employment Risk 
In traditional agency models, assumptions of 
self-interest dictate that performance be precisely 
specified at the time of negotiation and be subse- 
quently judged exclusively against that criterion 
(Harris & Raviv, 1978; Shavell, 1979). If an agent 
fails to perform according to a principal's ex ante 
expectations, the agent can be readily replaced, so 
monitoring can keep agent opportunism in check 
(Ross, 1973). However, given bounded rationality 
and information asymmetries, it may be impossible 
for a principal to specify performance criteria ex 
ante and to contract for the services of the best 
possible agent. For instance, "adverse selection" 
may result in an agent's misrepresenting his or her 
capabilities. The notion of a relational contract ac- 
commodates the fact that in a situation other than a 
spot transaction, the principal can use knowledge 
and information about the agent during the ex- 
change to determine if the agent is acting in the 
principal's interest. The agent is less inclined to act 
opportunistically because her or his welfare de- 
pends on future favors provided by the principal. 
Thus, relational, or long-term, contracting allevi- 
ates moral hazard problems stemming from diver- 
gence between the interests of principal and agent. 
Moreover, the principal can never be worse off in a 
long-term contract than in a sequence of short-term 
contracts because he or she can always replicate 
them in the long-term relationship (Lambert, 1983). 
Therefore, because relational contracting takes into 
account the possible future benefits of long-term 
relationships, it conforms to rationality conditions 
in agency theory, subject to certain constraints, 
such as incomplete contracting and opportunities 
for ex post negotiation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). It 
differs from traditional agency formulations in that 
relational contracting "is never completely discrete 
(i.e., anonymous, characterized by limited commu- 
nication)" (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995: 374) but 
evolves over time as additional information be- 
comes available and the parties learn to have faith 
in each other (Kay, 1992). From this perspective, 
trust is valued because it is instrumental; that is, it 
makes the agency contract more efficient or optimal 
(Portales, Ricart, & Rosanas, 1998). 
In a family contracting situation, a relational 
contract between a firm owned by a family and an 
agent (a family member) involves a common bond 
and a set of mutual expectations that are more 
likely to be based on emotions and sentiments 
than a nonfamily relational contract. Therefore, 
family bonds engender agency contracts that are 
prone to depart from economic rationality. The 
literature on family business is full of anecdotal 
evidence showing that family connections have 
many nonrational consequences. These include 
inability to transcend parent-child dynamics 
(Handler & Kram, 1988), sibling rivalry (Fahquar, 
1989), or generational envy (Applegate, 1994); 
allowing "unconditional love and concern to 
conflict with business values of profitability and 
efficiency" (Dyer, 1988: 224); power based on 
ascribed rather than achieved status (Dyer, 1994); 
difficulty in dealing objectively with a family 
member's performance and qualifications (Crane, 
1985); "inability to work rationally together to- 
ward an optimal resolution [which] needs an ob- 
jective understanding of one another's positions, 
common interests, and respective differences" 
(Kaye, 1991: 6); and a lack of rational systems 
based on merit (Kanter, 1989). 
Some authors have referred to family-owned 
businesses as "high trust" organizations (e.g., Jones, 
1983) because they are governed by underlying 
informal agreements based on affect rather than on 
utilitarian logic or contractual obligations. This 
type of trust is very different from the "calculative 
trust" that undergirds much of the relational con- 
tract literature. It would be analogous to the 
concepts of "affective" (McAllister, 1995) or 
"relational" (Bigley & Pearce, 1998) trust in the 
organizational behavior literature, whereby "emo- 
tion enters into the relationship between the 
parties ... leading to the formation of attach- 
ments . .. and entails a greater level of faith in the 
intentions of the other party" (Rosseau, Sitkin, 
Burt, & Camerer, 1998: 394). 
Under family contracting, both parties may at- 
tach value to the relationship that goes beyond the 
economic value created by transaction, and the per- 
ceived contributions of the agent may derive from 
kinship and often direct blood ties between agent 
and principal. Interaction between the two may go 
beyond that between a board of directors and a 
CEO, limited as it is to formal exchanges and re- 
porting requirements reinforced by the existence of 
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deterrents. Instead, the principal in a family-owned 
firm may be emotionally attached to the agent and 
thus may hold positive beliefs regarding this per- 
son's behavior or motives (Holmes, 1991). 
Traditionally, agency models are concerned with 
the separation of ownership and control in diversi- 
fied corporations, which gives rise to agency prob- 
lems as executives may take advantage of their 
privileged positions vis-a-vis atomistic sharehold- 
ers. A large number of studies have documented 
the presence of agency costs and the benefits of 
formal safeguards against them (such as closer 
monitoring of executives and performance incen- 
tives) in so-called management-controlled firms. 
These are generally defined as firms in which no 
single shareholder owns at least 5 percent of the 
stock. (For an extensive review of this literature, 
see Tosi et al. [1999]). Are there agency costs when 
an executive is part of the extended family that 
owns a business? Jensen and Meckling (1976) as- 
sumed that the blurring of the boundary between 
principal and agent in this type of family contract- 
ing would make moral hazard largely inconsequen- 
tial. Yet the literature on family business is replete 
with examples of how agency problems may still 
arise under family contracting because the interests 
of the executive are not necessarily the same as 
those of the shareholders-the extended family. 
These agency costs under family contracting are 
compounded by the fact, noted earlier, that affec- 
tive ties between the parties reduce the presence of 
formal safeguards designed to mitigate threats to 
firm performance. In other words, emotional as- 
pects of the relationship may neutralize mecha- 
nisms to reduce agency costs, a situation that is less 
likely to occur under nonfamily contracting. 
Agency threats under family contracting come in 
a variety of forms. First, there is the potential for 
incongruity between the goals of the executive and 
the family; thus, the executive may pursue objec- 
tives that are not in the best interests of the busi- 
ness. Anecdotal evidence from Donnelly (1964), 
Levinson (1983), Benson (1991), Davis and Haver- 
ston (1998), and others documents many problems 
under family contracting that parallel those dis- 
cussed in the mainstream (nonfamily) corporate 
governance literature. These include attention to 
short-term profits rather than long-term goals; re- 
luctance to be innovative, a classic risk avoidance 
posture; pursuing pet projects that enhance the ex- 
ecutive's self-image; and empire building through 
sales maximization at the expense of profits. As 
Peiser and Wooten noted, "The [family executive's] 
interests may move in directions away from the 
firm, and what is best for him may cease to be best 
for the firm [thus] goal congruency becomes a prob- 
lem between family members themselves" (1991: 
432). 
Other agency threats under family contracting 
were suggested in a recent survey of 3,860 U.S. 
family business owners conducted by the Arthur 
Andersen Center for Family Business (Schulze, 
Dino, Lubatkin, & Buchholtz, 1999). These include 
adverse selection, occurring because "the labor 
market that serves family firms is less efficient for 
various reasons [and characterized by a] smaller 
pool of applicants of more uncertain quality and 
limited promotional opportunities" (Schulze et al., 
1999: 7). Another one is hold up, occurring because 
family executives may be able "to impose their 
self-serving desires onto the key decisions of the 
firm by holding owners hostage... [agents] may 
hold a disproportionate amount of power, emanat- 
ing not only from the skills they may have (or may 
not posses) but more importantly from their family 
status" (Schulze et al., 1999: 8). Adverse selection 
and hold up occurring at the top may have a cas- 
cading effect on lower levels in a family business. 
For instance, lower-level managers may resent the 
implicit immunity top-level executives gain from 
their family status rather than from demonstrated 
performance and their ability to sustain their priv- 
ileged positions by successfully threatening hold 
up. "[These] comparisons can motivate non-family 
employees to shirk and misrepresent information 
about their actions" (Schulze et al., 1999: 10). 
Lastly, some research in the corporate gover- 
nance literature indicates that closely held firms 
may incur agency costs, because CEOs who are 
part-owners of a firm may use their equity positions 
to consume perks that reduce the residual claims of 
other shareholders. That is, these executives may 
get away with self-serving behaviors precisely be- 
cause their equity positions allow them to exercise 
more influence (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
In fact, in his classical work on ownership struc- 
ture, McEachern (1975) found that agency prob- 
lems are as evident under conditions of high share- 
holder dispersion (management control) as under 
conditions of high executive ownership (owner 
management). Agency problems are lowest when 
major identifiable external shareholders own sig- 
nificant portions of firms, which are thus what 
McEachern called "externally controlled," a find- 
ing that has been replicated in numerous other 
studies (see the review by Tosi et al. [1999]). There- 
fore, by logical extension, executives may still act 
opportunistically, even though they are members of 
the families that own the businesses that employ 
them. In other words, one cannot assume that the 
motivation, desires, and concerns of a family exec- 
utive are identical to those of other family share- 
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holders or that the family executive will try to do 
what is best for the firm rather than pursue a per- 
sonal agenda. Thus, goal conflicts between princi- 
pal and agent under family contracting may give 
rise to the threat of moral hazard. 
Family Contracting, Firm Performance, and 
Managerial Tenure 
An agency cost that has received much attention 
from corporate governance scholars is managerial 
entrenchment, which refers to executives' holding 
their jobs past the point where their stewardship is 
beneficial to owners (see reviews by Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman [1997] and Walsh and Seward 
[1990]). Agency theorists, particularly in the man- 
agement field, have recognized that executives will 
try to neutralize internal control mechanisms to 
ensure self-preservation. Walsh and Seward (1990) 
detailed many agent entrenchment approaches ex- 
ecutives may use, including hiding or obscuring 
negative attributes, hiring consultants to legitimize 
decisions, convincing the board to recognize the 
primacy of environmental determinism, manipu- 
lating or biasing information, and making them- 
selves irreplaceable (nonsubstitutable) by embark- 
ing on business strategies that capitalize on their 
idiosyncratic skills and abilities. 
Entrenchment research, almost all of which has 
been conducted in large diversified firms, has 
shown that such agency costs are associated with 
high ownership dispersion, because use of moni- 
toring is low (Tosi et al., 1999). On the basis of our 
prior discussion, we would also expect to find 
higher executive entrenchment under family con- 
tracting because emotions may color perceptions of 
the competence of executives, reducing monitoring 
effectiveness. In other words, family status leads to 
biased judgments about the appropriateness of ex- 
ecutive decisions. Thus, assessment of agent per- 
formance under family contracting may shift nega- 
tive performance attributions from the agent to 
exogenous forces; such assessment implicitly insu- 
lates agents from disciplinary action by recognizing 
extenuating circumstances that may be responsible 
for poor outcomes and may even alter the defini- 
tion of performance ex post in light of those cir- 
cumstances. Therefore, an agent-principal family 
contract is likely to reduce an executive's employ- 
ment risk since the agent is not held directly ac- 
countable or liable for observed performance out- 
comes. The first hypothesis follows from the 
preceding arguments: 
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between exec- 
utive tenure and a firm's performance will be 
weaker for executives with family ties to the 
firm's owners than for executives without such 
family ties. 
Business Risk, Family Contracting, and 
Managerial Tenure 
An issue related to differential performance- 
tenure sensitivity as a function of family versus 
nonfamily contracting is the extent to which exec- 
utives who have family bonds to firm owners are 
sheltered from business risk. Because most of the 
agency literature has dealt with governance issues 
in corporations whose owners' portfolios are diver- 
sified, business risk is generally viewed as positive 
from the point of view of shareholders' welfare. In 
fact, an economically rational principal with a di- 
versified (risk-neutral) portfolio of stocks will actu- 
ally prefer riskier actions than will managers (who 
can't diversify employment risk because of their 
dependence on a single employer). This may in- 
crease the likelihood of lower returns for a partic- 
ular firm yet will also increase the total expected 
returns of all the companies that form part of the 
principal's portfolio (Coffee, 1988). In other words, 
the presence of business risk in a particular firm 
may be seen by diversified stockholders as an in- 
dicator that its executives are pursuing the high- 
risk, high-return strategy that shareholders prefer 
(Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). 
In the case of smaller, closely held family firms, 
however, shareholders personally incur greater 
risks as a consequence of executive actions; thus, 
they will prefer lower business risks than their 
counterparts in large diversified firms. When a 
principal's ownership position is closely tied to 
one firm and options are constrained by high asset 
specificity, the principal prefers less business risk, 
since business failure may imply the loss of all 
returns (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In other words, if 
a principal's wealth largely depends on a single 
investment, one would expect that the principal 
would be risk averse and would rather see agents 
behave in a risk-averse manner with respect to that 
investment. In line with the above logic, owners 
should be more prone to risk averseness in closely 
held family firms with fewer slack resources be- 
cause risk bearing for them is inherently higher 
than it is for diversified corporate investors. In this 
context, principals are likely to see lower business 
risk as a sign that executives are protecting the 
family's patrimony (Hollander, 1983; Miller & Rice, 
1967), providing employment and financial secu- 
rity for the family (Liebowitz, 1986), and buffering 
the family firm from environmental instability (Das 
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& Teng, 1998). Paradoxically, although principals 
should be more risk-averse in a family business 
context, executives under family contracting are 
less likely to be penalized for evidence of high 
business risk because they are protected by their 
family ties to owners. That is, family contracts re- 
duce the sensitivity of managerial tenure to busi- 
ness risk. For executives of family-owned firms 
who are not members of the extended family, busi- 
ness risk is likely to be seen as an agency threat, 
and they are more prone to be disciplined accord- 
ingly. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2. Higher business risk is less likely 
to lead to an executive's dismissal when the 
executive is a member of the extended family 
that owns a firm than when there are no family 
bonds between the executive and firm owners. 
The Moderating Role of Executive Level: CEOs 
versus Editors 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 argue that, under nonfamily 
contracting, principals are more likely to hold ex- 
ecutives liable for their actions because affect plays 
a lesser role than in the case of family contracting. 
At the same time, we expected that those execu- 
tives who operate under more strongly relational 
contracts, even if they have no family ties to prin- 
cipals, should experience greater decoupling of 
tenure and objective, measurable results. Thus, we 
predicted that in our population of newspapers, the 
tenure of CEOs would be less sensitive to observed 
outcomes than the tenure of the editors who di- 
rectly report to the CEOs. The reason for this is that, 
although "[all] exchanges include some relational 
elements" (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995: 374), a 
contract with a CEO will by necessity be more 
strongly relational than a contract with an editor. 
Tasks are less programmable for a CEO, the job is 
more ambiguous, the transactions are more uncer- 
tain, and the human and procedural skills required 
are broader and less specific than they are for an 
editor. 
The presence of a more relational contract for a 
CEO than for an editor relaxes the need for clear 
performance criteria and increases the expecta- 
tion that performance will be evaluated more 
subjectively and reflect interpretations concern- 
ing the changing conditions surrounding the con- 
tract. Furthermore, compared to the editor, the 
CEO is generally expected to have a more stable, 
longer-term relationship with the newspaper's 
owners and to have more direct, continuous con- 
tact with them. (It is notable that in our popula- 
tion of newspapers, the average tenure of the 
CEOs was 25 percent longer than that of the ed- 
itors.) In the case of CEOs, this expectation of 
long-term contact allows owners "to diversify 
away some of the uncertainty surrounding the 
agent's actions" (Lambert, 1983: 442). Thus, al- 
though greater controls are still in place under 
nonfamily contracting (as per Hypotheses 1 and 
2), the information value of observed outcomes 
decreases as principals develop more familiarity 
with a CEO, giving them a better opportunity to 
distinguish between unfortunate exogenous cir- 
cumstances and mismanagement when they eval- 
uate the executive. These arguments lead to Hy- 
pothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between firm per- 
formance, business risk, and executive tenure 
will be lower for executives operating under 
strongly relational contracts than for executives 
operating under weakly relational contracts. 
Agent Dismissal and Organizational 
Consequences 
The discussion leading to Hypotheses 1 and 2 
concerns the employment consequences for an 
agent of the magnitude and riskiness of firm per- 
formance outcomes that depend on whether their 
agency contracts are family or nonfamily contracts. 
The next hypothesis concerns the normative impli- 
cations for owners when chief executive officers 
are removed from office, the "so what" question 
raised by Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (1997). In 
the context of this study, the most fundamental 
consequence to owners of CEO removal is its effect 
on organizational survival. The mortality rate of 
small businesses is rather high, and it is especially 
high for newspapers (Sohn, Ogan, & Polich, 1986). 
The question of whether or not managerial suc- 
cession enhances firm survival "continues to in- 
trigue organizational scholars because the empiri- 
cal findings are inconsistent" (Haveman, 1993: 
864). Carroll (1984) found that the dismissal of 
newspapers' executives augmented the mortality 
rates of these firms. In a different industry, Singh, 
House, and Tucker (1986) found the opposite re- 
sults, revealing that the survival rates of voluntary 
service organizations improved in response to CEO 
successions. More recently, using a sample of early 
20th century small telephone companies in south- 
eastern Iowa, Haveman (1993) corroborated Car- 
roll's findings that succession precipitated organi- 
zational mortality. She concluded that "clearly, the 
limited and conflicting evidence researchers have 
to date suggests that the relationship between man- 
agerial succession and organizational mortality 
needs further investigation" (1993: 865). 
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The agency theory argument is that senior man- 
agers will be dismissed when the board responsible 
for monitoring their behavior has decided that they 
are incompetent or lagging behind their counter- 
parts in competing firms in skills and abilities. In 
other words, employment risk is an integral part of 
the internal monitoring mechanisms used to disci- 
pline managers when firm performance is in jeop- 
ardy (Walsh & Seward, 1990). As James and Sorel 
argued in their discussion of managerial exit, "Dis- 
missal is the ultimate sanction which conditions 
their [managers'] behavior" (1981: 16). Other things 
being equal, by dismissing top managers who are 
deemed to be ineffective and replacing them with 
successors who presumably have more talent, firms 
should remain viable for longer periods of time. As 
is argued below, given that a family contract is 
more resilient than a nonfamily contract and thus 
that the former promotes greater tenure than the 
latter (as per Hypothesis 1 and 2), one would expect 
to find that removal of a family-member executive 
from a family-owned firm has a more positive im- 
pact on firm survival than the removal of a non- 
family executive. 
Donnelly (1964) examined the history of selected 
family firms that survived and failed. He concluded 
that although family membership may give a man- 
ager greater employment security, "[Successful] 
firms have ensured, through establishment of for- 
mal checks as well as informal traditions, that these 
claims will not dominate" (Donnelly, 1964: 96). 
Donnelly also noted that replacement of top exec- 
utives who were family members strengthened 
overall company morale by showing that "the right 
to manage has to be earned by family members in 
the same manner as by nonrelated employees. A 
relative's name may get him to the door but the rest 
is up to him" (Donnelly, 1964: 97). The broader 
strategy literature suggests that lengthy executive 
tenure may be detrimental to firms owing to a va- 
riety of factors, including low willingness to ex- 
plore new market opportunities (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), increased complacency (Finkel- 
stein & Hambrick, 1990), poor strategic choices re- 
sulting from rigid decision processes (Katz, 1982), 
"tunnel vision" (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991), and 
an overly conservative posture associated with the 
aging of a CEO (Coffee, 1988). To the extent that 
family-based contracts reduce the disciplinary ef- 
fects of observed firm performance (as per Hypoth- 
esis 1) and business risk (as per Hypothesis 2) on 
CEO tenure, one would expect that if agency pre- 
dictions are correct, a family-owned firm that takes 
the more drastic step of replacing a CEO who is a 
member of the family should survive longer. In 
other words, executive entrenchment is more likely 
to occur under family contracting (as per Hypoth- 
eses 1 and 2), so that executive transitions should 
have a more positive impact on firm survival in this 
situation than in a nonfamily context. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4. CEO terminations will have a 
more positive effect on organizational survival 
under family contracting than under nonfam- 
ily contracting. 
METHODS 
Research Setting and Data 
The population of firms for the study was all the 
daily newspapers published in Spain during the 
period 1966-93. We created the database, consist- 
ing of 276 newspapers, by pulling information from 
three separate sources. The first source was the 
Registry of Newspapers (Registro de Empresas 
Periodisticas). A listing in this registry became le- 
gally mandated for all newspapers published in 
Spain on March 18, 1966. The registry contains 
extensive information on each publication, includ- 
ing the title, founders, owners, number of pages, 
location, and target audience. Our second source, 
the Media Guide of Spain (Guia General de Me- 
dios), contains detailed demographic data on each 
firm and its top two executives, including when it 
was founded, when it ceased operations (if appli- 
cable), and the exact date of the hiring and termi- 
nation (if any) of each CEO and editor. The last 
source is an ongoing report produced by an inde- 
pendent newspaper association, the Oficina de Jus- 
tificacion de la Difusion, which shows the total 
number of newspapers that are produced and sold 
by each firm (circulation). 
There were several advantages to using this pop- 
ulation. First, as noted in the introduction, these 
organizations differ substantially from the type of 
firms generally studied by agency scholars. First, 
these are simpler organizations (in terms of size, 
product diversification, ownership structure, and 
such) than the complex, corporate, United States- 
based entities that are normally examined in the 
governance literature. These characteristics, which 
more closely depict the firms that are typical 
around the world, are valuable in assessing the 
generalizability of agency theory predictions about 
the sensitivity of executive tenure to firm perfor- 
mance and the consequences of agent removal. 
Thus, a distinct advantage of the database used 
here is the opportunity that it provides to study 
principal-agent relations outside of the traditional 
corporate governance framework. 
Second, the use of newspapers as a population to 
test the hypotheses controlled for many extraneous 
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factors that may affect the relationships among firm 
performance, business risk, executive tenure, and 
organizational survival. All the firms were (1) in 
the same industry, (2) in the same country, (3) 
insulated from global market forces, since compe- 
tition for inputs and outputs and demand/supply 
factors in the newspaper industry are largely local, 
(4) exposed to similar historical forces during a 
single time period, and (5) not subject to as much 
information asymmetry and complexity as other 
types of firms, such as high-technology firms (e.g., 
Hambrick, Black, & Fredrickson, 1992) or large di- 
versified corporations (e.g., Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 
1993). Furthermore, the jobs of CEO and editor are 
very similar across newspapers, so we were implic- 
itly controlling for interorganizational differences 
in work-related tasks, responsibilities, and position 
requirements. 
Third, it was possible to identify the family con- 
nections of these top executives, enabling us to test 
the effect of relational principal-agent contracts.1 
Lastly, performance data for the newspapers (vol- 
ume of circulation, as described later) were readily 
available, very straightforward, difficult to manip- 
ulate, and directly comparable from one newspaper 
to another and from one executive to another. As 
noted below, the circulation data also allowed us to 
calculate an index of business risk for the period 
corresponding to the tenure of each executive. 
Measures 
Family status. The presence or absence of family 
ties between principal and agent was determined 
separately for each CEO and editor. In the case of 
the CEO, we compared the last name with the last 
name of a newspaper's owners. In the case of the 
editor, who reports to the CEO, we confirmed fam- 
ily status if both executives had the same last name. 
Spain legally requires use of the last names of both 
father and mother, a practice that makes it easier to 
trace family ties. 
Relational agency contract. Per Hypothesis 3, 
the degree to which an agency contract is relational 
should be stronger for a CEO than for an editor. The 
CEO reports to a firm's board of directors and is 
responsible for all strategic and financial affairs of 
the business. On the other hand, the newspaper 
editor is a professional journalist responsible for 
routine procedural matters, technical issues, imple- 
mentation of the strategies traced by the CEO and 
the board (for instance, compliance with ideologi- 
cal orientation), the content of the newspaper, and 
staff supervision. The editor is explicitly hired to 
perform a job for a fee. Our analyses of the sensi- 
tivity of executive tenure to performance and busi- 
ness risk were conducted separately for the CEOs 
and the editors. 
Executive tenure. For each CEO and editor, we 
recorded how much time had transpired between 
the date of hiring and the date of termination (if the 
individual had been replaced) or 1993 (if the indi- 
vidual was still on the job). In the latter case, the 
information was treated as "censored" data (Cox & 
Oakes, 1984). 
Performance. Financial earnings data were not 
available for the population of firms used in the 
study, and very few of these firms were publicly 
traded. An excellent performance measure for 
newspapers is the volume of circulation, a number 
that is not subject to accounting manipulation and 
that can be meaningfully and unambiguously 
tracked both longitudinally (within newspapers) 
and cross-sectionally (across newspapers). Further- 
more, volume of circulation is the single most im- 
portant variable that determines the advertising or- 
ders received by a newspaper and how much it can 
charge for ads (Smith, 1980). In turn, advertising is 
the main source of revenues for newspapers (Sohn 
et al., 1986). 
We calculated two performance indicators using 
volume of circulation as an input. Performance 
trend consisted of the percent change in the num- 
ber of newspapers sold from the time the executive 
took office to the time the executive departed (or to 
the end of 1993, if the executive was still in office). 
This measure of the growth (or decline) in newspa- 
per sales during the executive's tenure was calcu- 
lated separately for each CEO and each editor. Per- 
formance changes consisted of the percent change 
in the average number of newspapers sold between 
the tenure of a particular executive and the preced- 
ing executive. This index was also calculated sep- 
arately for each CEO and editor. We used these two 
performance indexes as independent variables, 
with the executive's tenure as the dependent vari- 
able, to test Hypothesis 1. 
1 Information about the precise distribution of owner- 
ship within each newspaper is not publicly available. 
However, it is safe to assume that families play a key 
ownership role in these newspapers. Family names asso- 
ciated with ownership of the largest newspapers include 
Luca de Tena (Diario ABC), Polanco (El Pais), Asension 
(El Periodico de Cataluna), and De Salas (Diario 16). 
Families are likely to be in even stronger ownership 
positions among smaller (mostly local and regional) 
newspapers. Furthermore, prior to 1994 (the first year 
after the period used for this study), external investment 
in the newspaper industry of Spain was negligible. 
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Business risk. Performance variance relative to 
performance level is one of the most widely used 
measures of business risk in the strategic manage- 
ment literature (Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). 
Lack of access to the newspapers' financial data 
and the fact that these firms were not publicly 
traded meant that we had to rely on circulation 
figures for our business risk indicator. Accordingly, 
business risk during the tenure of each executive 
was measured as the ratio of the variance in the 
volume of newspapers sold (circulation) divided by 
a term consisting of the average circulation minus 
the minimum circulation squared. Other things be- 
ing equal, the more the average circulation for a 
given period exceeds the minimum circulation, the 
term in the denominator increases, and business 
risk decreases accordingly. Conversely, other 
things being equal, as the variance in the volume of 
newspapers sold (the numerator) increases during a 
given period, business risk increases accordingly. 
This index is similar to the coefficient of variation, 
which is widely used to measure a firm's business 
risk (see the 1995 review by Shapira). Miller and 
Reuer wrote that "the coefficient of variation is, by 
construction, positively related to the variance [of 
performance outcomes over time] and negatively 
related to the mean of the distribution . .. hence, 
implicit in this measure is the notion that, for 
any given level of variance in performance, firms 
with higher mean [performance outcomes] have 
lower risk" (1996: 672). The ratio was subjected to 
a logarithmic transformation since the distribution 
that best fitted the data was "lognormal." We cal- 
culated this ratio separately for the period corre- 
sponding to the tenure of each CEO and each editor 
and used it as an independent variable, with the 
executive's tenure as a dependent variable, to test 
Hypothesis 2. 
CEO succession. Two sets of dummy variables 
were created to measure the effect of CEO succes- 
sion on organizational survival (as per Hypothesis 
4), one set for CEOs who had family ties to owners 
and one set for those who did not have such ties. 
We coded each dummy variable as 1 if a firm had a 
particular succession and as 0 otherwise. We exam- 
ined up to four successions for nonfamily CEOs 
and up to two for family CEOs since these ranges 
encompass over 90 percent of the exits during the 
1966-93 period. 
Length of survival. A measure was created to 
capture how long the newspaper remained in cir- 
culation following each CEO succession event up 
to the next succession event (if any). If the news- 
paper went out of business after a particular CEO's 
departure, the chronological difference between 
the date of succession and the date the paper 
ceased to be published was used as the measure of 
survival length. If the newspaper remained in busi- 
ness after a CEO was replaced, survival length was 
measured as the chronological difference between 
the two succession events. This variable was used 
as a dependent variable in tests of Hypothesis 4. 
Control variables. As noted earlier, the popula- 
tion of firms used here effectively controls for many 
factors, including time period, industry forces, and 
technology. In the survival analysis (discussed be- 
low), we also excluded newspapers (n = 39) that 
had ties with the state's single party (El Movi- 
miento) during the dictatorship of Generalisimo 
Francisco Franco, since some of these may have 
disappeared for political reasons after Franco's 
death in 1975. Other variables in the database, such 
as ownership of the printing house and type of 
newspaper, were not theoretically relevant to the 
study and did not exhibit a significant correlation 
with any of the independent or dependent vari- 
ables of interest. To prevent loss of power, we did 
not include these in the multivariate analysis. 
In view of prior research, we controlled for three 
variables. Density (the number of newspapers op- 
erating in a given period) and density squared (di- 
vided by 100) for the same period are both proxies 
for the extent of competition during a particular 
time (Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). The third 
variable we controlled for was capital structure, 
coded as 1 if a firm issued stock to raise capital and 
as 0 otherwise (Haveman, 1993). 
Analysis 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested separately on 
both the CEO and the editor subgroups using life- 
time data models with right-censored observations 
(Lawless, 1982: 31). This procedure allowed us to 
test the relational contract hypothesis (Hypothesis 
3), which argues that the relation between an editor 
and a principal will tend to be confined to the 
exchange value of the transaction so that the edi- 
tor's tenure will be more closely tied to observed 
performance and business risk outcomes than the 
tenure of the same newspaper's CEO. 
For both the CEO and the editor, we measured 
the effects of family ties on the relationships be- 
tween performance and tenure (Hypothesis 1) and 
business risk and tenure (Hypothesis 2) by calcu- 
lating two models: one for executives with family 
ties and one for executives without family ties. For 
Hypothesis 1, the independent variables in both 
cases consisted of the two performance measures. 
For Hypothesis 2, the independent variables in 
both cases consisted of the business risk measure. 
Hypothesis 1 would be supported if the perfor- 
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mance effect on tenure was greater for CEOs and 
editors without family ties than for their counter- 
parts with such ties. Likewise, Hypothesis 2 would 
be supported if business risk were a stronger pre- 
dictor of tenure for CEOs and editors who worked 
in a nonfamily rather than a family contracting 
situation. 
A likelihood ratio statistic was used to ascertain 
if the corresponding coefficients were greater for 
one group than for the other (family versus non- 
family, CEOs versus editors), as predicted by Hy- 
potheses 1-3. A likelihood ratio statistic was also 
used to determine if the differences in the corre- 
sponding regression coefficients for the various 
subgroups were statistically significant and in the 
direction predicted by Hypotheses 1-3. 
Hypothesis 4 was tested by calculating a survival 
model, whereby each CEO succession event was 
entered as an independent variable, and the length 
of a newspaper's survival up to the next succession 
event (if any) was used as a dependent variable. 
Each transition was coded as family if the new CEO 
was part of the extended family that owned the 
newspaper or as nonfamily if the new CEO had no 
family ties to the owners. Hypothesis 4 would be 
supported if the coefficients for CEO family transi- 
tions were positive, statistically significant, and 
greater than those for nonfamily CEO transitions. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for both 
CEOs and editors. As can be seen in that table, the 
correlation among the two performance measures 
(Hypothesis 1) and business risk (Hypothesis 2) is 
not very high, indicating that from a measurement 
perspective there is little redundancy between the 
first two hypotheses. Table 2 shows the results of 
analyses with CEO tenure as the dependent vari- 
able, broken down by those with (first three col- 
umns) and without (last three columns) family ties 
to owners. Table 3 is equivalent to Table 2, except 
that the results pertain to editor tenure. 
As can be seen in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 
(CEOs) and Table 3 (editors), in three out of the four 
entries firm performance predicts the tenure of 
nonfamily executives. In contrast, columns 1 and 2 
of these tables (results for those with family ties) 
show that for neither CEOs (Table 2) nor editors 
(Table 3) is there any relationship between perfor- 
mance and executive tenure. With the exception of 
one performance measure (column 4 of Table 2), 
the differences shown in Tables 2 and 3 between 
the corresponding coefficients for family and non- 
family status are statistically significant at p c 
.0001 using the likelihood ratio statistics test, 
strongly supporting Hypothesis 1. In other words, 
under family contracting, dismissal of agents is a 
less likely response to negative performance re- 
sults. 
Tables 2 (CEO) and 3 (editor) also show the im- 
pact of business risk on the tenure of these two 
executives as a function of family status. Compar- 
ing columns 3 and 6 in Table 2, we see that a 
newspaper's business risk exerts a much stronger 
negative influence on the tenure of nonfamily CEOs 
(p c .01) than on the tenure of family CEOs (n.s.). 
These differences are statistically significant (p c 
.001, likelihood ratio test). The corresponding col- 
umns in Table 3 show the same effect for editors, 
with business risk exerting a very high impact on 
the tenure of nonfamily editors (p c .0001) and no 
statistically significant impact on editors with fam- 
ily ties to their CEOs. These differences are statis- 
TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa 
CEO Editor 
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Density 129.75 11.84 129.00 11.29 .99**** -.01 .22**** .22**** .03 .17*** 
2. Density squared/100 169.75 30.87 167.69 29.51 .99**** -.01 .23**** .23**** .03 .17*** 
3. Capital structure 0.96 0.18 0.95 0.20 -.08 -.08 .03 .00 .03 -.00 
4. Performance trend 0.07 0.40 0.06 0.32 .12* .12* .02 .59**** .07 .22**** 
5. Performance changes 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.26 .14* .14* .02 .65**** -.02 .14 
6. Business risk -1.04 0.89 -1.02 0.86 .06 .07 .06 .03 .04 -.19**** 
7. Tenure 5.61 5.37 4.57 4.94 -.03 -.02 -.05 .06 .14* .21**** 
a Correlations above the diagonal correspond to the editor; correlations below the diagonal correspond to the CEO. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
**** p < .0001 
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TABLE 2 
Effects of Performance and Business Risk on CEO Tenurea 
Family Ties No Family Ties 
Performance Performance Business Performance Performance Business 
Variable Trend Changes Risk Trend Changes Risk 
Density -0.79* (0.39) -1.09** (0.40) -0.77* (0.38) -0.04 (0.43) -0.06 (0.42) -0.35 (0.39) 
Density squared/loo 0.31* (0.15) 0.43** (0.15) 0.30* (0.15) 0.02 (0.17) 0.88 (0.16) 0.15 (0.15) 
Capital structure -0.68 (0.78) -0.60 (0.94) -0.58 (0.77) 
Performance trend -0.02 (0.28) 0.85 (0.84) 
Performance changes -0.20 (0.45) 2.19* (0.90) 
Business risk -0.13 (0.15) -0.56** (0.17) 
Constant 52.75* (25.06) 70.74** (25.66) 51.03* (24.88) 3.00 (27.75) 2.50 (26.98) 22.11 (24.97) 
x2 8.43t' 6.60 9.13t 3.58 15.69** 12.61** 
df 4 4 4 3 3 3 
a For the group with family ties, n = 227. For the group without family ties, n = 86. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients; 
values in parentheses are standard errors. 
tp < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
TABLE 3 
Effects of Performance and Business Risk on Editor Tenurea 
Family Ties No Family Ties 
Performance Performance Business Performance Performance Business 
Variable Trend Changes Risk Trend Changes Risk 
Density -0.29 (0.65) 0.35 (0.51) -0.17 (0.62) -0.31 (0.20) -0.49* (0.19) -0.34t (0.20) 
Density squared/lo0 0.14 (0.25) -0.11 (0.20) 0.10 (0.24) 0.13t (0.08) 0.20** (0.07) 0.14t (0.08) 
Capital structure 0.61 (0.54) 0.21 (0.47) 0.40 (0.53) 0.18 (0.48) 0.45 (0.45) 0.42 (0.47) 
Performance trend 0.76 (0.78) 0.93*** (0.26) 
Performance changes 0.73 (0.57) 0.71* (0.32) 
Business risk -0.56t (0.29) -0.39**** (0.09) 
Constant 14.86 (42.42) -25.52 (33.30) 7.08 (40.43) 19.30 (13.19) 29.92* (12.33) 20.53 (12.86) 
x2 14.00** 12.77 16.58** 75.24**** 41.08**** 41.00**** 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 
a For the group with family ties, n = 51. For the group with family ties, n = 368. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients; 
values in parentheses are standard errors. 
tp < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
**** p < .0001 
tically significant at p c .0001. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, this finding indicates that executives 
who do not benefit from a family contract face 
greater employment risk from business risk than 
their family counterparts. Another way of looking 
at this is that there is greater risk sharing between 
firm and agent when the executive is not buffered 
by a family contract. 
Although Hypotheses 1 and 2 generally hold true 
for both CEOs and editors, a close examination of 
Tables 2 (CEO) and 3 (editor) indicate that there is 
some evidence for the existence of a stronger rela- 
tional contract for CEOs than for editors. For edi- 
tors without family ties to CEOs, both performance 
measures are linked to tenure, one at p ' .001 
(column 4, Table 3) and one at p ' .05 (column 5, 
Table 3). In the case of CEOs, only one of the two 
performance measures reaches statistical signifi- 
cance at p ' .05 (column 5, Table 2). The differ- 
ences between the coefficients in columns 4 of 
Tables 2 and 3 are statistically significant at p c 
.0001. Results also show that for nonfamily execu- 
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tives, the sensitivity of tenure to business risk tends 
to be greater for editors (p c .0001, Table 3) than for 
CEOs (p < .01, Table 4). The differences between 
the coefficients in columns 6 of Tables 2 (CEO) and 
3 (editor) are marginally significant at p c .10. 
To summarize the findings reported so far, it is 
evident that the overwhelming factor that deter- 
mines the sensitivity of executive tenure to perfor- 
mance and business risk is family status. However, 
for agents without family ties to principals, results 
suggest that those with more strongly relational 
contracts (that is, CEOs) are evaluated less closely 
on the basis of observed outcome measures. 
The corresponding results for Hypothesis 4 are 
summarized in Table 4, which indicates that the 
consequences for firm survival of change from a 
CEO with family ties to owners are positive and 
statistically significant. In the case of nonfamily 
CEOs, executive successions have no effect on firm 
survival. These results support Hypothesis 4. In 
other words, if a CEO stays on the job longer than 
can be justified on the basis of observed results (as 
per Hypotheses 1 and 2), the positive consequences 
of replacing a family member are greater than the 
positive consequences of replacing a CEO who is 
not a family member. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented here indicate that monitor- 
ing mechanisms operate differently under family 
and nonfamily principal-agent contracts and under 
stronger and weaker relational contracts. This pat- 
TABLE 4 
Effects of CEO Succession on Length of 
Organizational Survivala 
Variable Length of Survival 
Density -2.17**** (0.38) 
Density squared/100 0.89* *** (0.15) 
Capital structure 0.48 (0.43) 
First succession, nonfamily -0.24 (0.49) 
Second succession, nonfamily -0.10 (0.65) 
Third succession, nonfamily 0.75 (1.09) 
Fourth succession, nonfamily 4.58 (38.45) 
First succession, family 0.86* (0.41) 
Second succession, family 1.07** (0.35) 
Constant 132.65**** (23.46) 
v2 123.33**** 
df 9 
a Values are unstandardized regression coefficients; values in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
**** p < .0001 
tern is evidenced by the fact that the links between 
performance, business risk, and executive tenure 
are stronger when agents have no family ties to 
principals and are also stronger for newspaper ed- 
itors than for CEOs. 
The study also indicates that the organizational 
consequences of CEO dismissal are stronger when a 
replaced CEO is a family member. Results showed 
that organizational survival length increased when 
family CEOs were replaced but did not when there 
was a change in command among their nonfamily 
counterparts. In conjunction with the results con- 
firming Hypotheses 1 and 2, this finding suggests 
that family CEOs are not necessarily driven by a 
common family interest and that steps taken to 
increase their accountability reduce agency costs 
(as evidenced by longer firm survival). Thus, al- 
though the benefits of achieving "good agency" 
cannot be directly measured, we can deduce from 
these findings that when appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms are in place, agency threats in family 
firms are less severe. 
Overview of Results 
This study empirically supports what some of 
the anecdotal evidence in the family business liter- 
ature indicates. For example, Prokesch (1991) re- 
ferred to the case of the Marriott Corporation, one 
of the best-managed hotel and food services com- 
panies in the world. Willard Marriott, Jr., chairman 
of the board and son of the corporation's founders, 
boasts that Marriott's endurance and success as a 
closely held family firm can be attributed in large 
measure to the "easing out of unproductive rela- 
tives" (that is, achieving lower agency costs 
through effective monitoring). The practical impli- 
cations of this view are enormous, given the low 
life expectancy and poor survival rates of family- 
owned businesses. For instance, Ward (cited in 
Prokesch, 1991: 180) reported that only 6 out of 200 
firms in his study survived more than 60 years. 
Similarly, Benson (1991) noted that less than 13 
percent of family businesses survive to the next 
generation. Obviously, the problem of agency is 
only one of many factors contributing to these grim 
statistics; however, consistent with our data, it is 
likely that "a major reason [for the high failure rate] 
is the conflicting needs of business and family" 
(Benson, 1991: 327). 
We have interpreted the fact that tenure is less 
sensitive to firm performance and business risk 
indicators for CEOs than for editors as evidence 
that the former operate under more strongly rela- 
tional (longer-term) contracts than the latter. An 
alternative interpretation is that the presence of a 
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more strongly relational contract for the CEO posi- 
tion facilitates the incumbent's entrenchment, to 
the detriment of the principal. In other words, an 
executive under a strongly relational contract (that 
is, a CEO) may take advantage of a principal by 
decoupling employment risk (being replaced) from 
observed performance outcomes. In turn, an exec- 
utive under a more weakly relational contract (that 
is, an editor) may be blamed for poor performance 
and serve as a scapegoat for disappointing results. 
We have no way to directly test this alternative 
"power interpretation" (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982), 
but we do not view it as a very plausible one in the 
context of this study. This is because the observed 
differences between the CEOs and editors for the 
coefficients of interest (the two performance vari- 
ables and the business risk measure) occurred only 
when there were no family ties. And, given that all 
the firms studied were closely held, both theory 
and empirical research would suggest that their 
owners should have had a strong interest in closely 
monitoring executive behaviors (Tosi et al., 1999). 
It is therefore unlikely that in our sample, nonfam- 
ily CEOs would be allowed to receive more favor- 
able treatment or to get away with more self-serving 
behaviors than editors. In other words, high own- 
ership concentration in the hands of family mem- 
bers would make it difficult for nonfamily CEOs to 
garner enough power to deflect scapegoating and 
pass blame on to their fellow executives (their ed- 
itors). 
The research reported here does not support the 
notion that managerial succession is merely a sym- 
bolic event that has no effect on firm survival 
(Brown, 1982; Gamson & Scotch, 1964) or the view 
that it tends to precipitate organizational failure, as 
argued by population ecologists (e.g., Carroll, 1984; 
Freeman, Carroll, & Haveman, 1983; Haveman, 
1993). We found exactly the opposite in the case of 
CEOs who were family members, a pattern more in 
line with the argument that disciplining managers 
(through dismissal) when monitoring is low (under 
a family contract) enhances organizational sur- 
vival. This view is consistent with earlier research 
by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) showing that mar- 
ginal returns to monitoring are a decreasing func- 
tion of the level of monitoring. In that study, the 
authors found that increased CEO monitoring was 
associated with improved firm performance when 
monitoring was low but not when monitoring was 
high. 
An Agenda for Future Research 
There are several interesting empirical issues 
that could not be examined in this study because 
the data were not available. Three of these are par- 
ticularly salient. The first one is ownership struc- 
ture. We had no information on how firm stock was 
distributed among the relevant parties. This distri- 
bution is important because it is likely to influence 
the power structure within a firm and the potential 
for agency problems. For example, using a sample 
of large American firms, Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988) found that the relationship between 
agency costs and CEO stock ownership was curvi- 
linear. At very low levels of stock ownership 
(which they defined as 5 percent or less), a CEO 
had no leverage and thus very little power; at high 
levels of stock ownership (25 percent or more), 
however, the principal and agent were almost iso- 
morphic. In both cases, agency problems were not 
significant. According to Morck and his colleagues, 
agency problems are most severe in the midrange of 
the CEO ownership distribution (6-24%) because 
in this range the CEO enjoys sufficient power to act 
in a self-serving manner, at the expense of other 
shareholders, and do so with relative impunity. 
Although the operational definitions of low, mid- 
dle, and high CEO stock ownership should proba- 
bly be different in smaller, closely held family 
firms, the logic of Morck and his coauthors is com- 
pelling and provides a fertile arena for future the- 
orizing and empirical work on family business. 
A second issue is board composition. A large 
literature, almost all of it United States-based, fo- 
cuses on the characteristics of board of directors 
and the influence these have on the monitoring and 
incentive alignment of CEOs. Studied characteris- 
tics include the proportions of insiders and outsid- 
ers on a board, whether or not CEOs are allowed to 
serve as board chairs, and board interlocks (for 
reviews of this literature, see Kosnik and Chatterjee 
[1997] and Finkelstein and Hambrick [1996]). Re- 
sults of these studies have generally been mixed, 
but this literature suggests a number of board- 
related factors that could be examined in light of 
the hypotheses posited here. Research might, for 
example, address board size, board stock owner- 
ship, the proportion of family members on a board, 
and the presence of a firm's CEO and founder on 
the board. These data should be available in archi- 
val U.S. sources for both family-owned and non- 
family-owned firms as long as they are publicly 
traded. 
Lastly, executive pay instead of tenure could be 
examined as a dependent variable to test Hypothe- 
ses 1-3. Extending the arguments presented here, 
we would expect that the sensitivity of CEO com- 
pensation (typically measured in terms of pay 
level, pay changes, and pay mix) to performance 
and business risk would vary according to CEO 
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family ties to owners and the strength of relational 
contracts. Just as in the case of the board character- 
istics discussed above, this information can be ob- 
tained from archival sources for all family and non- 
family publicly traded U.S. firms. Unfortunately, 
these data are inaccessible or unavailable in almost 
all other countries (England being a notable excep- 
tion). 
Limitations 
As noted earlier, the population of newspapers 
used here has the distinct advantage of controlling 
for many extraneous factors that may affect the 
results. On the downside, there is a possibility that 
the results are not generalizable to other settings. 
For example, perhaps the salutary or negative ef- 
fects of executive succession are peculiar to each 
organizational population. Its impact may be more 
disruptive in other populations, such as those used 
by Haveman (1993), Carroll (1984), and Amburgey, 
Kelly, and Barnett (1993). It is also possible that 
national culture exerts some influence on the find- 
ings reported here. In Spain, as in most Latin coun- 
tries, close-knit families are the norm, and there is 
strong expectation of individual loyalty to the ex- 
tended family and vice versa. One could speculate 
that in highly individualistic countries, like the 
United States, where norms of family reciprocity 
and interdependence are weaker, the differences 
between family and nonfamily contracting would 
not be as sharp as those we observed in Spain. This 
is another interesting question that could be ad- 
dressed in a comparative international research. 
Conclusions 
This study represents a first step toward better 
understanding agency issues in family-owned 
firms and the effect of the nature of the studied 
executive position on the strength of the relational 
contract. Although much research remains to be 
done, this study suggests that principal-agent fam- 
ily bonds may increase agency costs but that these 
costs can be curtailed by use of appropriate moni- 
toring mechanisms within the family business. Al- 
though results were not as compelling for nonfam- 
ily contracting, our study suggests that even these 
relational contracts tend to attenuate the link be- 
tween tenure and observed performance. 
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